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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, J 
Plainti f f-Respondent, i 
v. \ 
RUDY RINGO DURAN, 1 
Defendant-Appellant. i 
} Case No. 870531-CA 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of Assault by a 
Prisoner, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 
76-5-102.5 (1978), in the Third Judicial District Court. This 
Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. 
S 78-2a-3(2)(f)(Supp. 1988). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the 
jury'8 guilty verdict which rejected defendant's claim of defense 
of self and habitation? 
2. Whether the trial court properly refused to reduce 
the felony charge to a misdemeanor where two statutes proscribed 
the same conduct but provided different penalties and the 
statutes were not duplicative as to their elements? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-102.4 (1978). 
Assault by a Prisoner — Any prisoner who 
commits assault by intending to cause bodily 
injury, is guilty of a felony of the third 
degree• 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-102.5 (1978). 
Assault Against Peace Officer on Duty - Any 
person who assaults a peace officer, with 
knowledge he is on duty, is guilty of a Class 
'A' Misdemeanor. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Rudy Ringo Duran, was charged with Assault 
by a Prisoner, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. S 76-5-102.5 (1978). Defendant was convicted as charged 
after a jury trial held September 29 1987, through October 2, 
1987, in the Third District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, 
the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge, presiding. Defendant was 
sentenced by Judge Uno on November 2, 1987, to a term of zero to 
five years in the Utah State Prison to be served consecutively 
with Defendant's previous convictions. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the day of the assault, October 29, 1986, defendant 
was an inmate at the Utah State Prison housed at cell-block "A" 
#320 (T. 236, 304). On the previous day, while defendant was 
locked in his cell, inmate John Neely assaulted Officer Norman 
Carpenter (T. 234, 332). Defendant participated in the commotion 
and excrement was found directly in front of his cell (T. 335, 
341). 
After inmate Neely was transferred to maximum security, 
Officers Carpenter and Swanti patrolled "AM block to quiet the 
inmates (T. 33). During this patrol, Officer Carpenter learned 
that defendant had verbally threatened another inmate (T. 242). 
Officer Carpenter wrote a report describing defendant's behavior 
during the Neely assault and the verbal threat (T. 242). 
Defendant was informed of the report and warned of the 
possibility of being sent to maximum security for management 
purposes (T. 243). 
The next day, Lieutenant Walter Yankovich, reviewed 
three separate reports written by Officers Carpenter, Swanti and 
another officer concerning the defendant (T. 127-28). The 
reports indicated that defendant had attempted to incite other 
inmates to assault Officer Carpenter by yelling, screaming, 
throwing excrement, and verbally threatening another inmate (T. 
105, 241-42). 
To verify the reports, Lieutenant Yankovich talked to 
Officer Swanti, who was on the shift with Officer Carpenter the 
night of the Neely assault, and with Kevin Ritchens, an inmate 
who was the lead of block "A" (T. 124-25). Lieutenant Yankovich 
then conferred by telephone with his superior, Captain Johnson 
(T. 105). Together they determined that defendant should be 
transferred to maximum security (T. 106). 
Lieutenant Yankovich summoned Officers Olin and Uriate 
to assist in transferring defendant to maximum security (T. 106). 
Once at the cell, Lieutenant Yankovich instructed defendant to 
dress and prepare to be transferred to maximum security (T. 106). 
Defendant was informed he was being moved for management control 
reasons (T. 106, 166, 181). 
As Defendant finished dressing, he was instructed to 
turn around and back up to the cell door to be handcuffed (T. 
107, 166, 178, 182). Prison policy requires all prisoners to be 
handcuffed while being transferred to a more restrictive facility 
(T. 107, 180). 
Defendant flatly refused to be handcuffed and informed 
the officers that, "I'm not going to max." (T. 178, 180, 189). 
Lieutenant Yankovich repeated the instruction that defendant turn 
around to be handcuffed (T. 107, 166). Defendant defiantly 
refused to follow the order and continued to stand in the center 
of the cell with his arms folded across his chest (T. 108). 
The officers then entered the cell and again instructed 
defendant to turn around to be handcuffed (T. 166, 178, 182). 
Defendant responded by assuming a combative stance in dropping 
his arms to his side and spreading his legs slightly apart (T. 
108, 140, 166, 183). 
As Lieutenant Yankovich turned away from defendant to 
get a pair of handcuffs from Officer Olin who was slightly behind 
Yankovich, defendant struck Yankovich in the face (T. 108, 136, 
167, 179, 183). Prior to the assault, Yankovich had neither 
verbally nor physically threatened defendant (T. 109, 315). 
The blow broke Lieutenant Yankovich's nose and blurred 
his vision momentarily (T. 110, 137). Defendant again attempted 
to assault the Lieutenant (T. 109, 137). However, three officers 
were able to subdue defendant as he continued to resist (T. 109, 
167, 183). Defendant was then handcuffed and transferred to 
maximum security (T. 109). Defendant continued to struggle 
against the officers en route to maximum security (T. 167, 168). 
Lieutenant Yankovich's injury was treated at the Utah 
State Prison Hospital (T. 100). The injury was diagnosed as a 
large fracture to the nose (T. 110). Lieutenant Yankovich 
received subsequent medical attention for a sore throat as a 
«.«*»„i + rsf KinnH flowina down his throat (T. 110). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Sufficient evidence existed to support a conviction for 
Assault by a Prisoner based upon the undisputed evidence that 
defendant struck the prison guard without provocation. 
Defendant's claim that he was being improperly transferred cannot 
be considered a justification to commit a criminal assault. 
While defendant is not precluded from asserting a civil rights 
violation for an improper prison transfer, this criminal appeal 
is not the proper avenue. The jury could have reasonably 
discounted defendant's self-defense claim because: (1) 
defendant's argument that a procedural violation licenses a right 
to use force is erroneous; (2) defendant was the aggressor; or, 
(3) in light of the circumstances, it was not reasonable for 
defendant to believe he was in imminent danger of bodily harm. 
The trial Court properly denied defendant's motion to 
reduce the felony conviction to a misdemeanor charge where the 
two statutes in question are not duplicative as to their 
elements. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A 
CONVICTION OF ASSAULT BY A PRISONER. 
A. An Improper Prison Transfer Procedure Is 
Not A Justification For Criminal Assault. 
On appeal, defendant contends that he had a complete 
defense to the assault charge. He bases his claim on the unique 
argument that he was justified in assaulting the prison guard 
because the transfer to maximum security without a pre-transfer 
hearing violated his federal and state due process rights. 
Defendant's claim should be rejected because he improperly 
asserts that an alleged civil due process violation is a legal 
justification to commit a criminally violent act. 
The central issue in this appeal is whether a criminal 
assault occurred, and not, as defendant asserts, whether there 
was an administrative procedural violation by prison authorities. 
A review of the record demonstrates that there was sufficient 
evidence to support a conviction of Assault by a Prisoner. 
In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence to 
support a jury verdict, it is well established that: 
It is the exclusive function of the jury to 
weigh the evidence and to determine the 
credibility of the witnesses, and it is not 
within the prerogative of this Court to 
substitute its judgment for that of the fact-
finder. This Court should only interfere 
when the evidence is so lacking and 
insubstantial that reasonable men could not 
possibly have reached a verdict beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
State v. Lamm# 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980) (footnote omitted). 
See also State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811 (Utah 1977); State v. Asay, 
631 P.2d 861 (Utah 1981); State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah 
1976); State v. Granatof 610 P.2d 1290 (Utah 1980); State v. 
Fort, 572 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1977); State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66 
(Utah 1977); and State v. Erickson, 568 P.2d 750 (Utah 1977). 
Moreover, "evidence is to be viewed in light most favorable to 
the jury's verdict.- State v. Gorlick, 605 P.2d 761 (Utah 1979). 
In the case at bar, an examination of all the evidence 
supports the conclusion that there was substantial evidence upon 
which the trier of fact could have found defendant guilty of 
assault. It is undisputed that defendant struck Officer 
Yankovich breaking the Officer's nose (T. 108, 307). The violent 
act was unjustified as Officer Yankovich had made no verbal or 
physical threats toward defendant (T. 109, 315). In fact, Officer 
Yankovich had turned away from defendant when defendant struck 
him (T. 108, 179). In viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict, and keeping in mind that in a 
jury trial it is the jury's exclusive function to weigh the 
evidence and determine the witnesses' credibility, sufficient 
evidence existed to support a conviction of Assault by a 
Prisoner. 
Defendant attempts to divert the Court's attention from 
the criminal assault to an alleged procedural violation by prison 
authorities. It is the State's position that if defendant has a 
meritorious civil claim, defendant is not precluded from bringing 
such an action against prison authorities. However, this criminal 
appeal is not the proper avenue. Thus, this Court should not 
review defendant's civil due process claim. 
A similar due process claim was asserted by prison 
inmates in a civil rights action in Lavine v. Wright, 423 F. 
Supp. 357 (D. Utah 1976). In Lavine, Utah State Prison inmates 
brought a civil action against prison administrators challenging 
the exact Administrative Segregation Procedures asserted in this 
case. See also Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Montayne v. 
Hayroes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976). Defendant likewise had the legal 
remedy of filing a civil rights action rather than resorting to 
violence. 
Additionally, defendant had the option to pursue a 
civil claim through the prison Inmate Grievance Procedure (T. 
317). In fact, defendant took advantage of the grievance 
procedure by filing a grievance against Officer Yankovich for 
transferring him to maximum security (T. 319). It is significant 
to note that the alleged procedural violation was subsequently 
dismissed by the proper prison authorities (T. 320). 
In sum, defendant had civil remedies available to 
address any alleged civil rights violation resulting from the 
prison transfer. However, defendant's violent method of self-
help cannot be justified as a lawful remedy to alleged due 
process violations, 
B. The Jury Could Have Properly Rejected 
Defendant'8 Claim Of Defense Of Self And 
Habitation. 
Defendant asserts that the jury's rejection of the 
defenses of self-defense and habitation were erroneous and 
unsupportable. He argues that since the guards used greater 
force than was necessary to accomplish an unlawful transfer, he 
had the right to assault the prison guard to protect himself and 
his habitation. 
The central issue is whether under the facts of this 
case defendant could properly invoke the affirmative defense of 
self-defense. Self-Defense is defined in Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-
402 (1978) as follows: 
Force in defense of person—Forcible felony 
defined.—(1) A person is justified in 
threatening or using force against another 
when and to the extent that he reasonably 
believes that such force is necessary to 
defend himself or a third person against such 
other's imminent use of unlawful force; 
however, a person is justified in using force 
which is intended or likely to cause death or 
serious bodily injury only if he reasonably 
believes that the force is necessary to 
prevent death or serious bodily injury to 
himself or a third person, or to prevent the 
commission of a forcibly felony. 
(2) A person is not justified in using 
force under the circumstances specified in 
paragraph (1) of this section if he: 
(a) Initially provokes the use of force 
against himself with the intent to use force 
as an excuse to inflict bodily harm upon the 
assailant; or 
(b) Is attempting to commit, committing, 
or fleeing after the commission or attempted 
commission of a felony; or 
(c) Was the aggressor or was engaged in a 
combat by agreement, unless he withdraws from 
the encounter and effectively communicates to 
such other person his intent to do so and the 
other notwithstanding continues or threatens 
to continue the use of unlawful force. 
(emphasis added). 
Applying this statute, the jury had a number of grounds 
upon which it could properly have rejected defendant's claim of 
self-defense. Among other things, the jury could reasonably have 
found that: (1) defendant was not justified in using force to 
protect a constitutional right; (2) defendant was the aggressor; 
or, (3) it was not reasonable for defendant to believe it was 
necessary to use force to defend himself. 
Defendant's claim that an administrative due process 
violation is somehow a defense to an assault is completely 
erroneous and without legal foundation. Such a violation does 
not justify assaultive behavior. In State v. Wick, 331 N.W.2d 
769 (Minn. 1983), the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the 
argument that assaultive behavior is justified to protect a 
constitutional right and upheld a conviction of assault. The 
defendant in Wick had assaulted a police officer because the 
officer's search was more broad than defendant deemed necessary. 
As to a defendant's rights in the face of a constitutional 
violation, the Court stated that: 
"while a defendant would have a right to 
resist an officer in order to defend himself 
or another against unjustified bodily attack, 
assaultive conduct is not justified solely on 
the ground that the officers are violating 
the defendant's fourth amendment rights or on 
the ground that the defendant believes that 
the officers are violating his rights." 
Id. at 771 
The Illinois Appellate Court in People v. Taylor/ 112 
111. App. 3d 3, 67 111. Dec. 677# 444 N.E.2d 1151 (1983) also 
held assaultive behavior to be unjustified to preserve a 
constitutional right. In Taylor# the defendant contended that he 
struck the officer because the officer was interfering with the 
defendant's First Amendment right to free speech. The Court 
rejected this argument and found that a violation of a 
constitutional right "did not constitute a defense to the charge 
of battery." Id. at 1152. 
In the case at bar, defendant attempts to hide his 
assaultive behavior behind the protective cloak of the 
Constitution. Defendant alleges that in assaulting the officer, 
he was seeking to preserve the right to a pre-transfer hearing. 
If this Court adopted defendant's reasoning, then chaos would 
result as assaultive behavior would be a judicially condoned 
method of remedying any alleged administrative procedural 
violation. 
Moreover, at trial, defendant testified that he was 
willing to go to maximum security as long as he was not 
handcuffed during the transfer (T. 307, 311-12, 314, 319). 
Prison policy provides that all prisoners being transferred 
within the prison be handcuffed during transfer (T. 107, 180). 
Defendant testified that he was aware of the prison policy having 
been handcuffed during previous transfers (T. 316). 
In an attempt to comply with prison policy, Officer 
Yankovich repeatedly instructed defendant to turn around to be 
handcuffed (T. 166, 171, 314). Defendant verbally denounced the 
order by telling the guards -that I refuse to be handcuffed." (T. 
314). As Officer Yankovich turned away from defendant to get the 
handcuffs from another officer, defendant physically denounced 
the order by striking Officer Yankovich (T. 108, 136, 167, 174, 
183). There was no discussion about a constitutional right to a 
hearing, only a violent refusal on defendant's part to follow 
prison policy (T. 108, 189). Defendant refused to be handcuffed, 
so he struck the officer. 
To accept defendant's claim is to permit violence as a 
remedy for any perceived due process violation. Defendant is 
bankrupt for legal support justifying violence as a due process 
remedy. Therefore, this Court should find that the legality of 
the transfer is not relevant to the assault charge. 
Defendant attempts to support his self-defense claim by 
analogizing the alleged unlawful transfer to be an unlawful 
arrest. He argues that since Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (Supp. 
1988) infers a privilege to resist an unlawful arrest, defendant 
had the right to resist the unlawful transfer. While some states 
do allow a person to resist an illegal arrest, this is a limited 
privilege and courts refuse to condone assaultive behavior as a 
reasonable means of resisting an illegal arrest. 
For example, the Mississippi Supreme Court in Watkins 
v. State, 350 So.2d 1384 (Miss. 1977) upheld a conviction of 
aggravated assault on a police officer. The Court determined 
that even though the arrest violated the Fourth Amendment rights 
of the defendant because it lacked probable cause, the existence 
of the limited privilege to resist arrest did not authorize the 
defendant to commit an assault. The Mississippi Court reasoned 
that -there is no judicial way that [defendant's] resistance can 
be classified as privileged or condoned by a court in modern 
society . . . Moreover, there would have been available to him 
the legal processes of the courts for vindicating his illegal 
arrest if indeed it was such." Jd. at 1387. 
In State v. Harrell, 67 N.C. App. 57, 312 S.E.2d 230 
(1984), the North Carolina Court of Appeals recognized the right 
to reasonably resist an illegal arrest, but upheld a conviction 
for an assault on a police officer. The Court stated that Heven 
if defendant had been illegally restrained under the fourth 
amendment, he had the right to use only such force as reasonably 
appeared necessary to prevent the unlawful restraint of his 
liberty." Id., at 235. In upholding the conviction, the court 
interpreted defendant's act of striking the officer in the face 
as an unnecessary show of force that fell outside of the limited 
privilege of resisting an unlawful arrest. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Bradshawf 541 P.2d 
800 (Utah 1975) condoned an arrestee's degree of resistance in an 
illegal arrest. In Bradshaw, the defendant "offered no 
interference whatever except to touch his fellow townsman, an 
officer, and actually walked away from . . . the officer . . ." 
Id., at 803 (Henriod, Chief Justice, concurring). While the Utah 
Supreme Court has not completely addressed what constitutes 
reasonable behavior in resisting an illegal arrest, surely "an 
arrestee is never justified in assaulting an arresting officer 
unless the officer assaulted him first." Brooks v. State, 144 
Ga. App. 97, 240 S.E.2d 593 (1977). 
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that defendant 
assaulted the prison guard without provocation (R. 108-09, 307, 
315). Such unprovoked violent behavior cannot be judicially 
condoned as falling within the limited privilege of resisting an 
illegal arrest. Further, the prison transfer should not be 
considered an "arrest" where defendant had been committed to the 
custody of the Department of Corrections and was simply being 
transferred to a more restrictive environment. 
In any event, the jury was instructed regarding 
defendant's self-defense theory (R. 111-12, 114-19; Jury 
Instruction No.'s 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, and 30.) They were 
instructed that "if such evidence of self-defense when considered 
in connection with all other evidence in this case raises a 
reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt or if it raises 
reason to believe that the defendant acted in self-defense, you 
must find him not guilty." (R. 119; Jury Instruction No. 30). 
Upon deliberation, the jury rejected defendant's self-defense 
claim and issued a verdict of guilty as charged (R. 165; 
Verdict). On appeal, this Court will not disturb a jury's 
verdict unless the evidence is so "insubstantial or lacking that 
reasonable individuals could not have reached a guilty verdict 
beyond a reasonable doubt.- State v. Warenski, No. 880293-CA, 
slip op. at 2 (Utah Ct. App. December 19, 1988)(Per Curiam 
Memorandum Decision Not for Publication)(citations omitted). In 
light of the undisputed evidence that defendant was the aggressor 
not the defender, the jury could have reasonably rejected 
defendant'8 theory of defense of self and habitation. 
In State v. Starks, 627 P.2d 88 (Utah 1981), the Utah 
Supreme Court upheld a jury instruction which specified Hthat 
self-defense is not a justification when the defendant is the 
aggressor." ^d., at 90. In reaching this decision, the Court 
reasoned that "if the defendant were found to be the aggressor he 
could not rely on the defense of self-defense. £d. at 91. See 
also State v. Robinson, 40 N.C. App. 514, 253 S.E.2d 311 (1979). 
Under a similar analysis, the Maine Supreme Court in 
State v. Millet, 273 A.2d 504 (Me. 1971) determined that because 
the accused was the aggressor, the accused was not entitled to 
any self-defense instructions. 
-We are satisfied that in a day of 
increasing resort to violence these are 
salutary rules indeed. The law of self-
defense is designed to afford protection to 
one who is beset by an aggressor and 
confronted by a necessity not of his own 
making. It must not be so perverted as to 
justify [an assault] which occurs in the 
course of a dispute provoked by the defendant 
at a time when he knows or ought reasonably 
to know that the encounter will result in . . 
. combat . . . The law cannot give sanction 
to the settling of disputes by the use of 
[force]." 
Id. at 510. 
In the case at bar, the theory of self-defense is not 
appropriate where defendant initiated the violence. Therefore, 
he cannot now claim that his actions were in self-defense. As 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court said, H[o]ne who seeks and brings on 
an affray cannot shield himself under the plea of self-defense." 
Jenkins v. State, 161 P.2d 90, 96 (Okla. 1945). See also People 
v. Schliesser, 671 P.2d 993 (Colo. App. 1983). 
Defendant asserts that while he may have been the 
aggressor, it was reasonable for him to believe that he needed to 
defend himself by force against the unlawful force of the prison 
guards. He argues that although the prison guards did not 
verbally or physically threaten him, the mere presence of three 
guards in his cell constituted a greater force than necessary to 
transfer a prisoner (T. 315, 318). Thus, defendant interpreted 
their presence as a threat "that they were going to assault me.M 
(T. 308, 318-19). Defendant's claim should be dismissed because 
his subjective fears without more is not enough to support a 
claim of self-defense. 
The test for self-defense is both subjective and 
objective: the individual must believe that he is in imminent 
danger and such a belief roust be reasonable. "A subjective fear 
does not by itself entitle the defendant to use self-defense." 
Tatman v. Cordinglyf 672 P.2d 1286, 1290 (Wyo. 1983). According 
to Prosser: 
"The privilege to act in self-defense 
arises, not only where there is a real 
danger, but also where there is a reasonable 
belief that it exists. 
The belief must, however, be one which a 
reasonable roan would have entertained under 
the circumstances . . . [I]t is not enough 
that he really believes that he is about to 
be attacked, unless he has some reasonable 
ground for the belief . . ." 
Prosser, Torts, S 19 p. 109 (4th ed. 1971). 
In applying this objective standard, the Utah Supreme 
Court in State v. Maestasf 564 P.2d 1386 (Utah 1977) affirmed a 
conviction of an assault by a prisoner. In Maestas, the 
defendant's self-defense claim was based on the idea that the 
prison environment made defendant more fearful of his personal 
safety, having been stabbed in a previous prison brawl. Id. at 
1387. In upholding the conviction, the Court discounted 
defendant's subjective fears because there was no reasonable 
substantial evidence to support defendant's self-defense theory. 
See also Bennett v. Brandrud Manufacturing Co., 1 Wash. App. 183, 
459 P.2d 977 (1969). 
In a case almost identical to the case at bar, the Utah 
Supreme Court in State v. Dock, 585 P.2d 56 (Utah 1978) refused 
to reverse a conviction of assault by a prisoner. In this case, 
as two prison guards entered the defendant's cell to transport 
him to maximum security, the defendant assaulted one of the 
guards. The defendant based his self-defense claim on the idea 
that "he was afraid when the guards came to transfer him to 
maximum security.- Ici. at 57. The Utah Supreme Court rejected 
defendant'8 fears as unreasonable under the circumstances as "no 
evidence was presented showing the entrance into the defendant's 
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Likewise, in the case at bar, no evidence was presented 
showing the entrance into defendant's cell was unlawful or 
violent. In fact, the guards only entered the cell after 
defendant repeatedly refused to back up to the jail bars and be 
handcuffed as instructed (T. 166, 178). The basis of defendant's 
fear was that the mere presence of three guards in his cell 
presented a threat that he would be beaten (T. 315, 318-19). 
Defendant's fear was completely subjective and not objectively 
reasonable in view of the lack of aggression on the part of the 
guards. Since, defendant's subjective fear without more is not 
enough to support a claim of self-defense, the jury could have 
properly discounted defendant's self-defense claim. 
Defendant argues that his fear was reasonable because 
on the day prior to the assault Officer Carpenter threatened to 
send defendant to maximum security (T. 243). However, since 
Carpenter's threat to send defendant to maximum security was not 
accompanied by any threat of violence to defendant, it was not 
reasonable for defendant to believe he was in imminent harm when 
the prison guards attempted to transfer him to maximum security. 
The jury also properly rejected defendant's claim of 
defense of habitation. The United States Supreme Court held in 
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) that a prisoner has "no 
expectation of privacy- in his cell. Id. at 526. Because 
defendant had no privacy interest in his cell, his habitation 
defense is meritless. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO REDUCE THE FELONY CHARGE TO A 
MISDEMEANOR. 
Defendant contends that he was unlawfully charged and 
convicted. He argues that since he could have been charged under 
two different statutes which proscribe identical conduct, but 
impose different penalties, the trial court erred when it refused 
to reduce the felony charge to a misdemeanor. 
Defendant was charged and convicted of Assault by a 
Prisoner, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-5-102.5 (1978) which provides: 
Assault by a Prisoner — Any prisoner who 
commits assault by intending to cause bodily 
injury, is guilty of a felony of the third 
degree. 
The crime of Assault Against Peace Officer on Duty, a class "A" 
misdemeanor, is defined as follows: 
Any person who assaults a peace officer, with 
knowledge he is on duty, is guilty of a Class 
'A' Misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102.4 (1978). 
In support of his claim, defendant relies on State v. 
Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146 (1969) in which the Utah 
Supreme Court held that where two statutes proscribe the same 
behavior, but impose different penalties, the defendant is 
entitled to the lesser penalty. However, the application of 
Shondel is limited to situations where the statutes at issue are 
-wholly duplicative as to the elements of the crime." State v. 
Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 263 (Utah 1985); See also State v. Gomez, 
722 P.2d 747, 749 (Utah 1986). 
Applying this limited standard, the Utah Supreme Court 
in State v. Halesf 652 P.2d 1290 (Utah 1982) refused to reduce a 
felony conviction of Willfully Destroying Public Records by a 
Custodian. In Hales, the defendant could have been charged under 
the more general misdemeanor charge of Tampering with Records 
which applied to -any person.- In denying the reduction of the 
conviction, the court reasoned that while the conduct prohibited 
might be the same, the statutes were distinct in that they 
applied to different people. The court found that such a 
distinction was -manifestly rational- because -[p]ublic officials 
have greater access to public records and, by virtue of the 
public trust reposed in them, a higher responsibility to 
safeguard the interests and property of the public than do other 
members of the community.- Id. at 1293. 
In the case at bar, the statutes at issue can be 
distinguished on the same point. The crime of Assault by a 
Prisoner applies to -any prisoner- whereas the crime of Assault 
Against Peace Officer on Duty applies to "any person.- Thus, 
Legislature has determined that the act of a prisoner committing 
an assault should be punished more severely than an assault 
committed by other members of the community. Given the dangerous 
and highly volatile environment of prison life, such a 
distinction is -manifestly rational.- Hales, 652 P.2d at 1293. 
Additionally, the victims of the respective crimes are 
not identical. Assault by a Prisoner applies to violent acts 
against any person, not just police officers. Accordingly, a 
prisoner may be charged with Assault by a Prisoner by attacking 
another inmate. In contrast, Assault Against Peace Officer on 
Duty# by its own definition# applies only to attacks on law 
enforcement individuals, not the public generally. 
It is well-established that the Legislature has the 
authority to determine the degree of punishment for specific 
crimes. As the Utah Supreme Court stated in State v. Clark, 632 
P.2d 841, 843-44 (Utah 1981): 
It is not unconstitutional for a state to 
impose a more severe penalty for a particular 
type of crime than the penalty which is 
imposed with respect to the general category 
of crimes to which the special crime is 
related or of which it is a subcategory . . . 
As long as the legislative classifications 
are not arbitrary, the fact that conduct may 
violate both a general and a specific 
provision of the criminal laws does not 
render the legislation unconstitutional, even 
though one violation is subject to a greater 
sentence. 
Id. 
The comparative statutes at issue are clearly 
distinguishable in that they define dissimilar actors and 
victims. Because of the unique nature of prison life and the 
need for hightened deterrence, such a distinction cannot be 
classified as "arbitrary." Therefore, the prosecutor acted 
within his prosecutorial discretion when he charged defendant 
with a violation of a statute that "applies more specifically to 
the [defendant's] offense . . . " Rammell v. Smith, 560 P.2d 
1108, 1110 (Utah 1977). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, respondent 
respectfully requests this Court to affirm defendant's 
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